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Abstract
D etermining the optimal level and instruments of fi scal governance in a monetary union of sovereign states is not an easy task. A monetary union 
needs to have in place a comprehensive framework of fi scal governance, which 
allows enough fl exibility to deal with asymmetric shocks in different member 
states; discourage fi scal mismanagement, and minimize spillover effects when 
it happens; provide the means for effective fi scal management over the busi-
ness cycle; and build the necessary mechanisms to deal with a common exter-
nal shock. The fi scal governance designed at Maastricht was imbalanced and 
incomplete. It instituted a decentralized ‘individual responsibility’ approach, 
with no effective compliance mechanism and no support facilities for times of 
economic turbulence. Its weaknesses, revealed by the global fi nancial crisis, 
contributed to Eurozone’s deterioration into a second, debt crisis and a double 
dip recession. The lack of institutional provisions for dealing with the crisis, 
turned its handling into a de facto political, and therefore, intergovernmental 
process where creditor countries, enjoying a highly asymmetrical negotiating 
advantage, dictated both the terms of the bailout agreements and the provisions 
of the new fi scal governance. Being essentially a reinforced version of the pre-
crisis framework, the ‘reformed’ fi scal governance has tried to balance confl ict-
ing objectives with little success; it is simultaneously more constraining and 
more prone to political maneuvering, increasingly complex while leaving more 
room for variable interpretations, and ultimately it is not more effective than 
its predecessor. As a result, a short few years after its implementation, the calls 
for a new reform are multiplying.
KEY-WORDS: Fiscal governance, fi scal rules, moral hazard, risk reduction, risk 
sharing.
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Δημοσιονομική Διακυβέρνηση στην Ευρωζώνη: Από το 
Μάαστριχτ στην κρίση και πάλι πίσω;
Δημήτρης Κατσίκας, Επίκουρος Καθηγητής
Εθνικό και Καποδιστριακό Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών 
Περίληψη
Ο καθορισμός του βέλτιστου επιπέδου και των μέσων δημοσιονομικής διακυ-βέρνησης σε μια νομισματική ένωση κυρίαρχων κρατών δεν είναι εύκολο 
έργο. Μια νομισματική ένωση πρέπει να διαθέτει ένα ολοκληρωμένο πλαίσιο δη-
μοσιονομικής διακυβέρνησης, το οποίο θα επιτρέπει ευελιξία για την αντιμετώ-
πιση ασύμμετρων σοκ στα διάφορα κράτη μέλη· θα αποθαρρύνει τη δημοσιονομι-
κή κακοδιαχείριση και θα ελαχιστοποιεί τις δευτερογενείς επιπτώσεις όταν αυτή 
συμβαίνει· θα παρέχει τα μέσα για αποτελεσματική δημοσιονομική διαχείριση 
κατά τη διάρκεια του οικονομικού κύκλου και θα δημιουργεί τους απαραίτητους 
μηχανισμούς για την αντιμετώπιση ενός κοινού εξωτερικού σοκ. Η δημοσιονομι-
κή διακυβέρνηση που σχεδιάστηκε στο Μάαστριχτ ήταν ασύμμετρη και ελλιπής. 
Καθιέρωσε μια αποκεντρωμένη προσέγγιση «ατομικής ευθύνης», χωρίς αποτελε-
σματικό μηχανισμό συμμόρφωσης και χωρίς μηχανισμούς στήριξης για περιόδους 
οικονομικών αναταράξεων. Οι αδυναμίες της, αποκαλύφθηκαν από την παγκόσμια 
χρηματοπιστωτική κρίση και συνέβαλαν στην επιδείνωση της κρίσης στην Ευ-
ρωζώνη οδηγώντας σε μια δεύτερη κρίση χρέους και σε διπλή ύφεση. Η έλλειψη 
θεσμικών δικλείδων για την αντιμετώπιση της κρίσης μετέτρεψε τον χειρισμό της 
σε μια de facto πολιτική, και ως εκ τούτου, διακυβερνητική διαδικασία όπου οι 
πιστώτριες χώρες, βρισκόμενες σε μια εξαιρετικά πλεονεκτική διαπραγματευτική 
θέση, υπαγόρευσαν τόσο τους όρους των συμφωνιών διάσωσης όσο και αυτούς της 
μεταρρύθμισης της δημοσιονομικής διακυβέρνησης. Όντας ουσιαστικά μια ενι-
σχυμένη έκδοση του πλαισίου που προϋπήρχε της κρίσης, η νέα δημοσιονομική 
διακυβέρνηση στέφθηκε με περιορισμένη επιτυχία στην προσπάθειά της να εξι-
σορροπήσει αντικρουόμενους στόχους· είναι ταυτόχρονα πιο περιοριστική και πιο 
επιρρεπής σε πολιτικούς ελιγμούς· ολοένα και πιο πολύπλοκη, αφήνοντας παράλ-
ληλα περισσότερο περιθώριο για διαφορετικές ερμηνείες, χωρίς να είναι τελικά 
πιο αποτελεσματική. Ως αποτέλεσμα, λίγα μόλις χρόνια μετά την εφαρμογή της, οι 
εκκλήσεις για μια νέα μεταρρύθμιση πολλαπλασιάζονται.
ΛΕΞΕΙΣ-ΚΛΕΙΔΙΑ: Δημοσιονομική διακυβέρνηση, δημοσιονομικοί κανόνες, 
ηθικός κίνδυνος, μείωση του κινδύνου, επιμερισμός του κινδύνου.
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1. Introduction
D etermining the optimal level and instruments of fi scal governance in a mon-etary union of sovereign states is not an easy task. A monetary union needs 
to have in place a comprehensive framework of fi scal governance, which allows 
enough fl exibility to deal with asymmetric shocks in different member states; 
discourage fi scal mismanagement, and minimize spillover effects when it hap-
pens; provide the means for effective fi scal management over the business cycle; 
and build the necessary mechanisms to deal with a common external shock.
The fi scal governance of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
was the result of a political compromise. This led to an imbalanced and unsus-
tainable fi scal framework, which along with other shortcomings of EMU’s broad-
er economic governance contributed to the outbreak of the eurozone debt crisis. 
Eurozone’s lack of institutional preparedness forced European leaders and policy 
makers to embark on a reform effort at the same time that they were trying to 
bring the crisis under control. The adverse economic and political environment 
put pressure for prompt decisions, often based on last minute compromises and 
more often than not, on the imposition of the will of member states enjoying an 
asymmetrical power advantage in an increasingly intergovernmental negotiation 
setting. The resulting governance framework raises signifi cant political economy 
concerns, and it is doubtful whether it is effective and indeed, whether it signifi es 
a substantial departure from the previous governance’s failed philosophy.
The aim of this chapter is to explore these questions by reviewing the fi scal 
governance of the Eurozone and its evolution after the crisis, against lessons de-
rived from the theoretical and empirical literature on fi scal governance in a mon-
etary union. The fi rst part of the article engages with the theoretical and empiri-
cal literature on fi scal governance in a monetary union, employing insights from 
the Fiscal Federalism and Optimum Currency Area (OCA) theories, as well as 
from the literature on fi scal rules and coordination. The second part, focuses on 
the design and evolution of Eurozone’s fi scal governance, particularly following 
the crisis. The aim is to provide a critical examination of the reforms under the 
analytical lens of political economy, in order to evaluate their contribution to a 
more effective economic and monetary union. 
2. Fiscal policy in a monetary union
A ccording to classic public fi nance theory, a government can use the state budget to perform three basic functions: (a) the effi cient allocation of the 
resources of an economy (for example by providing public goods in case of market 
failure), (b) the redistribution of income and (c) the stabilization of economic ac-
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tivity in fl uctuations of the economic cycle or in case of an exogenous shock (Mus-
grave 1959). Although the justifi cation of these functions is based on economic 
criteria, their adoption as objectives of government policy depends to a large 
extent also on non-economic factors, such as political and social institutions and 
traditions, which shape the prevailing perception of the role of the state in a 
society, and thus affect the priority given to different functions, as well as the 
intensity with which these are pursued.
In the case of member states of the EMU, achieving a desirable but also fi s-
cally sustainable balance between these objectives, should also take into account 
the budgetary constraints and opportunities arising from their participation in 
such a union. In this context, a key question to be answered concerns the level of 
governance (national/supranational) on which the different budgetary functions 
should be exercised.
One way to answer this question is by recourse to the literature on ‘fi scal 
federalism’. The theory of fi scal federalism refers to the operation of a central 
fi scal system, which includes all members of a federal state, both the federal ad-
ministration, as well as the Länder or states (Whyman and Baimbridge 2004, 1). 
In its classical form, the theory puts forward arguments about the appropriate 
level (local/federal) of exercise of the different fi scal functions and what fi nancial 
tools should be used in each case (Oates 2004). More specifi cally, restrictions 
on the operation of the fi scal multiplier and the risk of external debt growth 
make stabilization operations less effective at the local level (Oates 1968). The 
effectiveness of the redistributive function is also hampered at the local level, 
due to the mobility of individuals and other productive factors, while fi nally, the 
effective production of public goods can be implemented at both local and central 
level, depending on the nature of these goods (Oates 1968).
The above analysis shows that despite the normative predilection of fi scal 
federalism for fi scal decentralization,1 the centralization of fi scal functions is 
often necessary. This conclusion is of interest in the study of fi scal policy in the 
EMU, which has several of the characteristics of a federation, such as a multi-
level governance structure, freedom of movement of goods, services and people 
and a common monetary policy. On the other hand, however, several of the as-
sumptions of the theory of fi scal federalism are not met in the case of the EMU. 
Thus, for example, the hypothesis of high labour mobility, which is central to 
the theory of federalism (Ribstein and Kobayashi 2006), does not apply in the 
EMU, as the existence of different institutions, languages and cultural tradi-
tions restrict the mobility of individuals. Also, an important hypothesis for the 
stabilization function, that cycle fl uctuations or exogenous economic shocks oc-
cur primarily at the national (central) rather than at the local level, does not ap-
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ply in the EMU, where different member states often face asymmetric economic 
shocks. Finally, unlike a federation, in the EMU there is no fi scal union where a 
budgetary authority can pursue fi scal policy at a central level. 
It is clear therefore, that the EMU’s sui generis nature, where increased 
levels of economic integration and multi-level governance structures co-exist 
with sovereign nation-states, complicates the determination of its optimal fi scal 
governance. The absence of basic characteristics of a typical federation, such as 
the high degree of human mobility and economic symmetry, is a problem for the 
functioning of the EMU, as according to the OCA theory (Mundell 1961, McKin-
non 1963, Kenen 1969), these conditions are considered to be particularly impor-
tant for the successful operation and stability of a monetary union.2
Economic symmetry ensures that the macroeconomic fl uctuations experi-
enced by members of a monetary union are closely correlated with each other. 
Otherwise, asymmetric economic shocks lead to very different macroeconomic 
developments in each country, which cannot be effectively addressed by the 
union’s single monetary policy (De Grauwe 2009). In these circumstances, fl ex-
ibility in the member states’ labour markets can be an important stabilizing 
mechanism. Labour market fl exibility refers both to the mobility of the labour 
force within the monetary union and the fl exibility of wages according to eco-
nomic conditions (Mundell 1961). Labour factor mobility allows workers to leave 
member states in the downside of the economic cycle, which experience high 
unemployment rates, and move to member states on a high growth trajectory, 
where there is strong demand for labour. Wage elasticity, respectively, allows 
wages to be adjusted downwards (upwards) in member states facing high (low) 
unemployment, thereby reducing (increasing) production costs and making their 
products more (less) competitive. This simultaneous adjustment helps to restore 
the balance between the member states of the union.
From the preceding analysis, it follows that when economic symmetry and 
labour mobility among member states of a monetary union are low, and wages 
in their labour markets do not adjust easily downwards, dealing with asym-
metric economic shocks is a major challenge. In these circumstances, and since 
the single monetary policy is not capable of effectively addressing the different 
asymmetric shocks, fi scal policy becomes necessary for stabilizing the economy. 
The budgetary stabilization function can be exercised both at the supranational 
and the national level.
The OCA theory supports the creation, at supranational level, of a central, 
common budget, which can automatically use the (increased) revenues from the 
countries on the upward phase of the economic cycle, in order to support the 
countries in recession, thus facilitating the adaptation of member states to asym-
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metric economic shocks (Kenen 1969). The creation of a common budget also 
has the advantage of removing pressure from national governments to use their 
national budgets to stimulate the economy in the event of a recession, avoiding 
the risk of running high budget defi cits, which, as experience has shown, are not 
easy to reduce, at least in the short-term.
However, the creation of a common budget has its own risks, and more spe-
cifi cally, the so-called ‘moral hazard’. Moral hazard arises from the alteration of 
the incentives of the governments of the countries receiving the cash fl ows from 
the central budget. Access to centralized funding relaxes incentives to promote 
and implement reforms, which may be necessary, particularly when the econom-
ic shock proves to be long-term, suggesting structural problems. For this reason, 
centralized budgetary transfers should have a limited duration and be used in 
short-term fl uctuations of the economic cycle and not in crises having structural 
causes, by substituting for necessary reforms (De Grauwe 2009).
3. The limitations of national fiscal policy in a monetary 
union
A t the national level, the functioning of automatic fi scal stabilizers can contribute to the smoothing of consumption and limit the negative effects 
of an economic shock. On the other hand, the use of discretionary fi scal policy to 
stabilize the economy is a much more complex issue, which presents signifi cant 
technical diffi culties (Tanzi 2005), poses the risk of further destabilization 
(Kamps et al. 2017) and could lead to high fi scal defi cits and the accumulation of 
public debt. If this happens, the cost of adjustment will be transferred to future 
generations, who will have to repay it through a restrictive fi scal policy, thereby 
limiting the degrees of freedom of future policy makers (De Grauwe 2009). This 
problem is magnifi ed when public debt reaches a level where its viability is 
questioned; in this case, the use of fi scal policy for stabilization purposes in the 
event of an economic shock will not available, worsening the potential effects of 
the shock.
On a second level, high budget defi cits and increased levels of government 
debt may create indirect negative effects in other member states of the monetary 
union (cross-border spill-over effects). According to the literature, these effects 
may stem either from the possible bankruptcy of a member state with increased 
levels of debt, or from the existence of high budget defi cits in a member state, 
even if there is no danger of bankruptcy (Buiter 2006).
In the fi rst case, the bankruptcy of one member state may lead to sig-
nifi cant problems in the fi nancial sector of other member states, in so far as 
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part of the fi rst state’s debt is held by investors in the other states (which is 
expected in a monetary union with increased levels of fi nancial integration). 
The possibility of a bankruptcy is increased in a monetary union, as in the 
event of a liquidity crisis, the inability to devalue the currency and exercise an 
autonomous national monetary policy create conditions for its conversion into 
a solvency crisis (De Grauwe 2011).
This creates an incentive for the other member states, to rescue the state 
facing a debt crisis, either directly or through a central (supranational) mecha-
nism, even when there are explicit rules (no-bailout clauses) that prohibit such 
action. Although historical experience from federal states has shown that no-
bailout rules have contributed to a more prudent fi nancial management on the 
part of local governments (Bordo et al. 2011), the case of a monetary union of 
sovereign states is different; the presence of no-bailout rules is not credible, as 
a possible bankruptcy would not only damage the economy and thus burden the 
budget of the other member states, but would also call into question the contin-
ued participation of the member state in crisis in the monetary union, risking an 
irreparable damage to the latter’s credibility.3
In the second case, the policy of increased budget defi cits by one member 
state may lead to an increase in infl ation and interest rates at the union lev-
el, thereby affecting both the economic policy of the other member states (e.g. 
through the adoption of restrictive budgetary measures to curb infl ation), and 
the exercise of monetary policy by the single monetary authority (Beetsma and 
Giuliodori 2010).
4. Fiscal Governance in a monetary union
T he mechanisms typically chosen to overcome the limits of supranational fi s-cal governance and address the risks of discretionary national fi scal policy 
within a monetary union are two: (a) fi scal rules and (b) coordination of national 
fi scal policies. The aim of fi scal rules is to place restrictions on the exercise of 
national fi scal policy to avoid excessive budget defi cits and the accumulation 
of public debt. The debate on fi scal rules in a monetary union revolves mainly 
around two issues: (a) their necessity and (b) their effectiveness.
On the fi rst issue, arguments have been made challenging the necessity of 
fi scal rules, particularly at the central (supranational) level. The inherent weak-
ness of fi scal rules emanates from their very nature, as they set predefi ned tar-
gets without taking into account the prevailing conditions, which creates a prob-
lem of time inconsistency for fi scal policy (Wyplosz 2012). The problem lies in the 
fact that the ‘rigidity’ of fi scal rules restricts the ability to exercise the stabiliza-
tion function at a time when it is most needed. The imposition of supranational 
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rules restricting the ability of national governments to react to adverse economic 
conditions inevitably leads to a clash between member states and monetary union 
institutions with negative results for the credibility of the rules and therefore for 
the functioning and reliability of the monetary union itself (De Grauwe 2009).4 
Furthermore, it is argued that the participation in a monetary union tends to 
improve the budgetary discipline of the member states, as they lose the ability to 
‘print’ money to fi nance their budget defi cits, thus making fi scal rules unneces-
sary (De Grauwe 2009).5 Finally, in so far as the spill-over effects of an expan-
sive fi scal policy in other member states are not signifi cant, the need to establish 
budgetary rules at the supranational level is called into question (Buiter 2006).
As regards the effectiveness of fi scal rules, recent empirical research seems 
to suggest a positive impact on the fi scal defi cit (e.g. Debrun et al. 2008, Holm-
Hadulla et al. 2012, Badiger and Reuter 2017). On the other hand, other studies 
report lack of impact when all available instruments of debt (Von Hagen 1991), or 
levels of government (Kiewiet and Szakalay 1996, Von Hagen and Eichengreen 
1996) are taken into account, or mixed results, depending on the effectiveness of 
the rules’ design (Kennedy and Robbins 2003, Tapp 2013, Caselli and Reynaud 
2019). A recent meta-regression analysis of 30 studies performed by Heinemann 
et al. 2018, points to overall positive results, which however are signifi cantly 
reduced when methodological approaches become more sophisticated to account 
for factors of endogeneity. The experience of EMU, as described in more detail 
in the next section, also gives a mixed picture, as the budgetary rules introduced 
by the Maastricht Treaty for entry into the EMU appear to have had a positive 
effect on the restriction of budget defi cits, while the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP) does not appear to have had an equally effective impact on the fi scal man-
agement of the member states once they were inside the Eurozone (Ioannou and 
Stracca 2011). This provides support for the view that fi scal rules are effective 
when they are compatible with the preferences of governments, i.e. when they 
act as mechanisms for signaling their incentives (Debrun and Kumar 2007), and 
not when they are used as ‘suppression’ mechanisms, since in this case policy-
makers fi nd ways to bypass the rules (Koen and Van Den Noord 2005).
The ambiguity about fi scal rules’ effectiveness, has led in recent years to 
a debate on the role of fi scal institutions and more specifi cally, the usefulness 
of independent fi scal councils (Calmfors and Wren-Lewis 2011, Wyplosz 2012, 
Debrun et al. 2013, OECD 2014, Calmfors 2015, Beetsma et al. 2018). Although 
fi scal councils had initially been considered as an alternative to fi scal rules (e.g. 
Wyplosz 2005), in recent years it seems that the use of fi scal councils is increas-
ingly considered as a complementary institution in an existing framework of 
fi scal rules (Calmfors and Wren-Lewis 2011, Wyplosz 2019). In particular, it is 
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considered that a fi scal council independent of political infl uence and increased 
technical competence can help both in designing and monitoring the implemen-
tation of more complex (non-rigid and counter-cyclical) fi scal rules.
On the other hand, fi scal councils should not be considered a panacea. Al-
though they can potentially play an important role in reducing the trend towards 
excessive budget defi cits, their effectiveness depends to a large extent on the 
root causes of defi cits and on their own institutional characteristics, which are 
shaped by the preferences of the political system, making them therefore subject 
to some of the same restrictions facing fi scal rules (Calmfors 2015). Although 
initial empirical studies show positive results from the functioning of the fi scal 
councils on budgetary discipline (Debrun and Kinda 2017), as well as on the 
quality of forecasts and the application of fi scal rules (Beetsma et al. 2018), it is 
probably still too early to draw defi nitive conclusions, particularly as there is a 
wide variety of institutional designs in place across countries. 
A second mechanism to address the potential negative consequences of uni-
lateral fi scal policies by the member states of a monetary union refers to the 
coordination of national fi scal policies. Although the adoption of common fi scal 
rules at the supranational level can be seen as a kind of coordination mechanism, 
it is not the same. In the case of common fi scal rules, member states act indepen-
dently and without taking into account the fi scal policies of the other member 
states; on the other hand, coordination requires cooperation between member 
states with a view to formulating a common fi scal stance at the union level.
Fiscal coordination has the potential to overcome the relative rigidity of fi s-
cal rules, and its benefi ts are magnifi ed during a crisis when the potential nega-
tive effects of unilateral discretionary fi scal policy increase (Frankel 2014, Alcidi 
and Gros 2014). Having said that, fi scal coordination is not easy to achieve given 
the different cyclical positions of different member states in a monetary union; in 
this context, the stabilization needs of individual states and the union as a whole 
may be different (Kamps et al. 2017), which could lead to a clash between the 
sustainability and stabilization objectives between different states. Implemen-
tation diffi culties aside, there is also some uncertainty about the desirability of 
fi scal coordination, given the possibility of member states in a monetary union 
working in a coordinated manner to pressure the single monetary authority to 
ease monetary policy (Beetsma and Giuliodori 2010).
The latter possibility also highlights a second dimension of fi scal policy co-
ordination in a monetary union, that between national fi scal policies and the 
single monetary policy. The coexistence of a single monetary and multiple fi scal 
authorities creates a confl ict of policy priorities and objectives resulting in an 
ineffi cient overall policy mix for the union. This ineffi ciency is likely to be mag-
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nifi ed in the event of a crisis, when interest rates fall to very low levels and the 
monetary authority is forced to enlist non-conventional monetary policy tools, as 
has been the case in recent years in the EMU; in this case, the coordinated use 
of monetary and fi scal policy is necessary in order to restore macroeconomic bal-
ance (Corsetti et al. 2016).
The previous analysis shows that fi scal policy at both the national and su-
pranational levels faces signifi cant constraints. A common, and perhaps most 
important, limitation for both levels of governance is the duration of its use. 
Although the defi nition of a predetermined period of time is not desirable, as the 
duration of its use for stabilization purposes should be judged individually ac-
cording to the type and intensity of the economic disorder that is called upon to 
address, it is obvious that its use for a long time can cause signifi cant problems.
This assumption highlights the importance of structural reforms in a mone-
tary union. More specifi cally, the preceding discussion of the OCA theory shows 
that reforms which increase the fl exibility of member states’ labour markets, so 
that the latter can act as a mechanism for restoring imbalances in the wake of 
asymmetric economic shocks, can improve the stability of the monetary union. 
The need to increase economic symmetry between member states of a monetary 
union also suggests the need to coordinate a range of national macroeconom-
ic and other policies, often linked to broader political, social and institutional 
characteristics of an economy. Different traditions, institutional characteris-
tics of the labour and product markets, but also political and social preferences 
on the level of wages, infl ation and unemployment can create economic diver-
gences with signifi cant consequences (Calmfors and Driffi ll 1988, Maclennan, 
Muellbauer and Stephens 1999).
In conclusion, the theoretical debate, the fi ndings of empirical research and 
historical experience seem to imply that the use of fi scal policy for stabilization 
purposes is necessary in a monetary union consisting of sovereign nation-states. 
However, given the political incentives for its abuse and the risks it entails both 
for the states exercising it and for the other members of the monetary union, it is 
equally necessary to create institutions to monitor and control its use. The views 
on the design and the level (national/ supranational) of fi scal governance are di-
vided, as some analysts consider it necessary to exercise centralized fi scal stabili-
zation, while others consider that a more fl exible central framework of fi scal rules, 
combined with the creation of national institutions such as fi scal councils, could 
be a satisfactory solution. In any case, promoting reforms for the convergence of 
economies and increasing fl exibility in the labour market should be considered 
necessary both to prevent the asymmetric economic shocks affecting the member 
states of a monetary union, and their more effective management when they arise.
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5. The development of fi scal governance in the EU
From EMU to the crisis 
T he idea of creating a supranational governance framework for fi scal policy in the EU is inextricably linked to the prospect of a European economic and 
monetary union. Although its implementation had to wait for the signature of the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the idea was fi rst suggested a long time before that. 
In particular, in 1970 the Werner Report argued for the need to coordinate the 
fi scal policies of the member states of an economic and monetary union,6 while 
the Marjolin Interim Report (1975), which examined progress towards economic 
and monetary integration, went much further, stating that all fi scal functions 
should also be exercised at the supranational level and proposed the creation of a 
Community unemployment fund as a kind of supranational stabilization mecha-
nism. The MacDougall report (1977), which followed, was the fi rst attempt to 
systematically study the fi scal dimension of European economic integration; the 
report adopted the previous proposals, which it analyzed more systematically, 
and proposed the possibility of grants and lending at the Community level for 
the stabilization of the economy and the management of the economic cycle both 
in different member states and for the European Economic Community as a 
whole. On the last point, the report refers to the need to coordinate fi scal and 
single monetary policy in the context of a monetary union.
The fi rst attempt to create a European economic and monetary union failed. 
The adverse economic conditions of the 1970s and the sharp exchange rate fl uc-
tuations following the collapse of Bretton Woods led member states to adopt 
independent and often divergent economic policies, which did not allow further 
progress. The EMU would have to wait for the revival of the European project 
in the mid-1980s, as the common currency was presented as a logical but also 
necessary complement to the single market.
The Maastricht Treaty provided for three stages on the road to the EMU. 
Fiscal policy was at the heart of this process from the second stage, which began 
on the 1st of January 1994 and introduced, inter alia, the fi scal rules (convergence 
criteria) laid down in the Maastricht Treaty. These appeared to work effectively, 
at least in part, since all the countries wishing to enter the EMU satisfi ed the cri-
terion for a budget defi cit of less than 3% by the end of the decade. On the other 
hand, the criterion for public debt (less than 60% of GDP) was clearly not met 
by three countries, Italy, Belgium and Greece.7 These countries were burdened 
with high levels of public debt (more than 100% of GDP) which could not be re-
duced to levels that met the sovereign debt criterion in the foreseeable future. To 
overcome this problem, the criterion included an ‘override clause’, which allowed 
higher levels of public debt, provided that the latter was on a downward trend. 
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The decision to override the debt criterion, illustrates the political nature of 
the EMU, which was clear from the outset (see Sadeh and Verdun 2009 for a re-
view of the relevant literature); when the decision to create the EMU was taken, 
it was obvious that the conditions for an optimal currency area were not met 
(e.g. Eichengreen 1990, De Grauwe and Heens 1993). Against this background, 
the design of EMU’s governance framework was bound to be shaped by politi-
cal factors. EMU’s governance refl ected more the preferences of certain member 
states and the balance of power in the EU at the time, rather than the dictates of 
economic theory. In particular, the pillar of monetary policy was, from the start, 
institutionally strong. The European Central Bank (ECB) had a clear mandate 
to maintain price stability, was equipped with all the necessary policy instru-
ments and authority and was protected from political interference. The strong 
institutional guarantee of ECB’s independence, but also its strict commitment to 
the objective of price stability, were modelled after the German central bank and 
refl ected Germany’s preferences in this fi eld.
On the other hand, the fi scal governance of the EMU was based on the Stabil-
ity and Growth Pact (SGP), which set a balanced or surplus budget as a medium-
term target for the member states of the euro area, establishing also a threshold 
(3% of GDP) for the start of an excessive defi cit procedure. This procedure could 
lead, on a proposal from the European Commission to be adopted by the Coun-
cil of Ministers, to recommendations to the member states violating the defi cit 
threshold; if these were not adhered to within a specifi ed timetable, sanctions 
could be triggered. The objective of the SGP was to ensure that member states 
adhered to budgetary discipline after entering the EMU (Pisani-Ferry 2006).
This institutional set-up soon proved to be ineffective; ironically, in 2003 
it was Germany, which had pushed for the SGP framework, but also France, 
that refused to implement the Commission’s recommendations on budgetary 
discipline in the midst of a recession, and led a coalition of states in the Council 
which blocked the continuation of the excessive defi cit process against them. In 
the wake of this confl ict, the renegotiation of the SGP in 2005 introduced more 
fl exibility, which was interpreted in many quarters as a weakening of the fi scal 
rules’ framework (Buiter 2006). In any case, the signifi cance of the reform is 
questionable, since data on member states’ fi scal management reveals that the 
SGP was equally ineffective both before and after the reform. For the EU-15, 
there were 14 cases of excessive defi cit (over 3% of GDP) between 1999-2003 
and another 16 cases between 2004-2007 (Begg 2011). In addition to these viola-
tions, there were another 50 cases of defi cit in the 0-3% range (Ibid), which while 
below the excessive defi cit threshold, were obviously not in compliance with the 
SGP’s target of balanced or surplus budget. It appears then that, after entering 
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the EMU, governments relaxed their fi scal efforts and the fi scal rules did not 
provide a credible external constraint, particularly since the political nature of 
the procedure ensured the impunity of the offenders. 
Given this data, it is evident that there was no EMU-wide fi scal stance and 
accordingly no coordination between fi scal and monetary policy before the crisis. 
Against a background of differential growth rates, driven by different institution-
al and economic dynamics (e.g. non-tradables in the periphery vs exports in the 
core) and divergent fi scal policies, the one-size-fi ts-all monetary policy, became a 
one-size-fi ts-none policy (Schmidt 2015), which ended up magnifying macroeco-
nomic imbalances between the member states. Thus, for example, the combina-
tion of substantial infl ation differentials and common offi cial rates, led to widely 
divergent levels of real interest rates. In countries like Ireland and Spain real 
interest rates were on average below one percent for the period 2000-2007, which 
in turn contributed to the creation of asset bubbles; during the period 2002-2007, 
dwellings’ prices increased by 70% in Ireland and doubled in Spain (Financial 
Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011). The development of signifi cant fi scal and mac-
roeconomic imbalances in several countries,8 resulted in increased divergence 
among euro area economies instead of the much-anticipated convergence. 
Once the bubbles collapsed, these countries were forced into an abrupt ad-
justment, as access to funding was quickly restricted. Things were even worse 
for countries like Greece, which had entered the global fi nancial crisis with lit-
tle fi scal space and a high public debt. There was no central instrument which 
could deal with the shock and ensure funding for the governments dealing with a 
meltdown of their fi nancial systems, the slowdown of their economies and/or the 
sustainability of their public debt. The EU’s budget, close to one percent of GDP 
was clearly insuffi cient to deal with the crisis -not that employing funds from the 
common budget for stabilization purposes was ever seriously considered- while 
the ECB was unable, due to its mandate, to act as a traditional lender of last 
resort, although it did employ various instruments designed to enhance access 
to credit and liquidity to the European banking system. 
In hindsight, it could be argued that the rationale of the pre-crisis fi scal (and 
more generally economic) governance in the EMU, rested on a political deal, which 
at the same time, employed and defi ed economic rationale. Against a background 
of low labour mobility and highly asymmetrical and diverse national economies, 
EU’s political leaders based the monetary union on institutionally weak fi scal and 
macroeconomic pillars and resisted the creation of supranational fi scal capacity, 
which could perform a stabilization function and coordinate an EMU-wide fi scal 
stance. By completely defying the tenets of OCA theory they effectively made 
sure that the growth of macroeconomic imbalances could not be monitored and 
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controlled, allowing thus the development of conditions that would lead to a cri-
sis, and that once a crisis erupted, there would be no procedure or mechanism to 
address it effectively. In combination with the monetary authority’s institutional 
constraints to act as lender of last resort, the institutional outcome ‘ensured’ that 
the consequences would be magnifi ed in the event of a crisis. 
Why did they opt for such an obviously imbalanced and ineffective frame-
work? The answer lies in a combination of national preferences, selective eco-
nomic argumentation and political short-sightedness. The stronger EU mem-
bers acknowledged the differences in the institutional organization and potential 
of different economies, but they opted to ignore them -a decision necessary to 
achieve the political agreement of weaker members- resting their hopes on a 
much anticipated ‘catching-up’ process, while also limiting their liability in case 
things did not develop as planned. This political compromise, was justifi ed by a 
selective use of economic theory, whereby OCA theory’s dismal predictions were 
replaced by the more optimistic projections of the so-called endogenous theory of 
optimal currency areas, which stipulated that economic integration and symme-
try could follow monetary unifi cation (Frankel and Rose 1998, 2002), and by the 
belief that ‘market discipline’ would prohibit the emergence of large imbalances, 
particularly when a no-bailout clause, was in place.
Unfortunately, markets dismissed the no-bailout clause alleging instead 
the existence of an implicit bailout clause. On this assumption, increased fi nan-
cial integration instead of disciplining member states, relaxed the funding con-
straints of weaker states, allowing the emergence of large fi scal deviations (e.g. 
Greece), or hiding weak fi scal foundations (as was the case with the fi scal wind-
falls related to real estate bubbles in countries like Spain, Ireland and Cyprus).9 
When the crisis hit, the decentralized ‘individual responsibility’ governance of 
the EMU, had no institutional tools to handle it, forcing member states to engage 
in a major reform effort, amid economic diffi culties and political recriminations.
Crisis and the fi rst wave of fi scal reforms 
The global fi nancial crisis unfolded gradually from 2007 in the US housing mar-
ket, and then expanded to the rest of the world and Europe at a rapid pace, 
particularly since the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. In this 
context, the outbreak of the Greek crisis in autumn 2009 exacerbated an al-
ready negative European and international economic environment and served 
as a catalyst for the wider eurozone debt crisis that followed. The crisis revealed 
the limitations of the Maastricht compromise -dealing with fi scal spillover ef-
fects became a necessity when sovereign default turned into a likely scenario. 
The danger of default in the periphery threatened the solvency of European 
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fi nancial institutions at the core, while the scenario of a default-induced exit 
of a member state from the Eurozone threatened the credibility and therefore 
survival of the entire monetary union. In this context, ‘bailing out’ countries 
under distress became necessary. The reluctant acknowledgement of this ne-
cessity did not alter creditor countries’ previous attitude on fi scal transfers and 
common fi scal capacity; on the contrary, it incentivized them to reduce their 
fi scal exposure as much as possible. The approach was justifi ed by invoking the 
moral hazard that would result from the creation of stabilization or other ‘fi scal 
solidarity’ mechanisms at the supranational level; countries in trouble needed 
to have the proper incentives to reform.
The handling of the crisis through national adjustment programmes with 
a view to ensure fi scal sustainability at the national level with the minimum 
pooling of fi scal resources at the supranational level, led to a prioritization of 
austerity over all other policies, including structural reforms (Pisani-Ferry et.al. 
2013, Petralias et al. 2018). The policy recipe was based on a diagnosis of fi scal 
mismanagement and irresponsibility, obviously not true for most cases aside 
Greece. The coincidence of the Greek crisis’ outbreak being the fi rst, erroneously 
shaped the view of policy-makers’ response to the other countries, whose prob-
lems did not originate from fi scal mismanagement (Buti 2020); the most likely 
explanation for this misdiagnosis is that the Greek case served as an excuse to 
promote a policy which satisfi ed creditor countries’ aversion to fi scal risk shar-
ing. Irrespective of one’s interpretation of decision makers’ motives, the result 
was an unnecessary and prolonged economic and social suffering in crisis-hit 
countries, which undermined further the economic and political cohesion of the 
euro area, and ultimately threatened its very survival.10 What is more, the en-
dorsement of austerity policies, even in countries like Germany, which did not 
face fi scal constraints, led to a de facto EMU-wide defl ationary fi scal stance, 
which led the euro area in a double deep recession in 2012/13. The asymmetry 
of the response was evident at both national and euro area levels; fi scal sustain-
ability took precedence over stabilization in the midst of a recession.
At the same time the EU was forced to reform its economic governance (see 
Appendix I for a brief review of the most signifi cant reforms). A cursory review 
of the reforms is enough to acknowledge that a signifi cant reform effort was 
made; existing rules and procedures were updated and entirely new institutions 
and mechanisms were introduced, making this the most comprehensive insti-
tutional reform initiative since Maastricht. Such progress notwithstanding, the 
design of the new economic governance echoed the approach that dominated the 
handling of the crisis. Given the narrative of fi scal irresponsibility, the empha-
sis of the reforms lay in the fi scal dimension of economic policy (Pisani-Ferry 
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2015). Their aim was to ensure fi scal sustainability in member states, in order 
to minimize negative fi scal spillovers and therefore the need for the pooling of 
fi scal resources at the supranational level. The creditor countries, which en-
joyed a highly asymmetrical negotiating advantage, came to dictate the terms of 
the new fi scal governance according to their national preferences (Schimmelfen-
ning 2015). In order to ensure the desired outcome, reforms were often negoti-
ated outside the EU’s legal framework; both of EU’s new funding mechanisms, 
the emergency European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the ESM, and 
one of the most important fi scal reforms, the Fiscal Compact, were negotiated 
as international agreements. 
Accordingly, the main reforms in the area of fi scal governance comprised 
mechanisms of enhanced national fi scal discipline and surveillance, while EMU-
wide fi scal coordination and/or supranational fi scal instruments and funding 
mechanisms were absent. The requirement of the Fiscal Compact for the incor-
poration of budgetary rules into national law, ‘two-pack’s’ requirement for the 
screening of national budgets by the European Commission before submission 
to national parliaments, the principle of a negative majority for the obstruction 
of sanctions on member states which do not apply the Commission’s directives 
within the framework of the excessive defi cit procedure, the obligation to create 
independent fi scal councils to supervise national fi scal policy and the enhanced 
surveillance procedures of the European Semester, have created a strong fi scal 
framework, which limits the budgetary discretion of national governments. 
At the same time, the stabilization function remained at the national level, 
with the main changes relating to the recognition of the need for greater fl exibil-
ity in order to cope with fl uctuations in the economic cycle. There was no move 
to create a stabilization mechanism at the supranational level, nor was the use 
of the EU budget discussed for macroeconomic stabilization purposes. Moreover, 
proposals for the creation of a European safe asset did not progress, despite the 
fact that it could provide an effective mechanism for restoring access to fund-
ing for countries undergoing a crisis and prevent uncertainty-induced contagion 
to other member states (Gilbert et.al. 2013).11 Furthermore, the coordination of 
fi scal policies remained an institutionally unrealized objective; nonetheless co-
ordination as previously noted, did take place, by member states’ voluntary or 
imposed adherence to austerity. The creation of the European Fiscal Council, 
which could assist in formulating a common fi scal stance, took place in 2017, 
several years after the fi rst wave of reforms; in any case its role is advisory, and 
its proposals do not have binding force. 
On the other hand, there were two important reforms with implications for 
fi scal policy. The fi rst was the establishment of last resort funding mechanisms 
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like the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).12 The ESM provides funding to 
countries which lose access to the international markets and thus functions as 
a lender of last resort. The problem however, is that it operates on the basis of 
strict policy conditionality, aimed at restoring imbalances at the national level. 
Conditionality tends to work in a procyclical manner, intensifying in the short-
term the negative effects of the economic shock. Beyond economic ineffi ciency, 
these features reduce the bailout programmes’ political appeal for member states 
in diffi culty and can produce frictions between national governments and EU 
institutions, undermining the credibility of the union. As already noted, these 
problems were observed during the crisis. A second signifi cant development re-
lates to the promotion of an EU Banking Union, intended to limit the close links 
between sovereigns and banks, which can prove detrimental in times of crisis 
for both sides. Although progress has been satisfactory regarding the establish-
ment of a common supervisory mechanism and restructuring procedures in case 
of a banking crisis,13 agreement on the common deposit guarantee system has 
proved elusive thus far, which is hardly surprising, in view of the shared liability 
it entails.
6. Completing the EMU’s fi scal governance 
T rying to balance confl icting priorities and objectives, has unsurprisingly led to unsatisfactory outcomes; the framework of fi scal governance has proven 
complex, technically diffi cult to implement and ineffective (Alcidi and Gros 2014, 
Pisani-Ferry 2015). Trying to ensure adequate fl exibility to deal with asymmetric 
shocks, without committing supranational resources has led to an ever-increasing 
number of overlapping rules and exceptions, which undermine both their 
operability, and their credibility, by allowing room for political maneuvering, not 
only by national governments, but increasingly by the European Commission as 
well (Claeys et al. 2016, Beetsma and Larch 2019). Indeed, the experience from 
the fi rst few years of the new fi scal framework’s operation casts doubt on its 
credibility as the application of fi scal rules has been characterized by discontinuity 
and inconsistency (Begg 2017).14 Paradoxically, the result is a fi scal governance 
framework, which while relying more than ever before on rules, at the same 
time allows more discretion in their interpretation and implementation (Begg 
2017). In the end, and in spite of all the reforms efforts, it seems that once again, 
as was shown before the crisis, fi scal performance responds more to domestic 
political preferences and constraints, rather that adjust to externally imposed 
fi scal rules. This is nowhere demonstrated as vividly as in the system’s inability 
to enforce fi scal targets symmetrically, that is, not only for the defi cit but also 
for the surplus countries,  like Germany, which in recent years as noted above, 
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tightened its fi scal policy well above its SGP medium-term objective (Claeys et 
al. 2016). Beyond the economic ineffi ciency that such an asymmetry entails, it 
also undermines the ability to coordinate an EMU-wide fi scal stance, and has 
signifi cant distributional implications for the other euro area member states.
Given these problems, there seems to be wide agreement that, so soon after 
its reform, the EMU’s fi scal governance needs to be reformed again (Beetsma 
and Larch 2019). In this context, the European Commission proposed new 
measures and a roadmap for the completion of EU’s economic governance 
(European Commission 2017). In addition, to amendments in order to streamline 
existing institutions, the Commission proposed new and ambitious initiatives, 
including among other things, turning the ESM into a European Monetary 
Fund and founding the position of a European fi nance minister. The European 
Commission’s proposals and the proposals of the French President Emmanuel 
Macron in September 2017, for a broader EU reform, triggered a public debate 
on the issue of EU’s economic governance.15
Although the terminology has slightly changed, the stakes in the discussion 
have remained the same; the distribution of costs to restore balance in the European 
economy. The debate is now taking place in terms of actions necessary to reduce 
or share the risk, that is, the cost for dealing with the crisis’ legacy problems. 
The position on risk reduction essentially represents the position of the creditor 
countries, that restoring the balance should be the result of an adjustment process 
undertaken by the member states that face problems, which, of course, would 
alone bear the cost of this adjustment. Only when the imbalances faced by these 
states are addressed and therefore the risk of fi scal and other economic spillovers 
has been reduced, can the discussion on more ambitious risk-sharing initiatives 
proceed. This sequence of political choices illustrates the basic argument on which 
this view is based, which is none other than moral hazard. The concern is that the 
introduction of risk-sharing mechanisms prior to the completion of the adjustment 
process will create distorted incentives for the political elites of countries in 
trouble, thereby loosening their reform efforts. This will lead to a perpetuation of 
problems in these economies, which will be able to survive thanks to transfers and 
guarantees of solidarity mechanisms at the supranational level. The permanent 
nature of these transfers essentially entails the establishment of a transfer union.
On the other hand, those who argue that emphasis should be placed on risk-
sharing mechanisms are essentially calling for greater solidarity. The economic 
rationale behind the immediate creation of risk-sharing mechanisms lies in the 
belief that the creation of such mechanisms will contribute to reducing risk, thus 
facilitating and accelerating the adjustment process. A particularly important 
element of this argument has to do with the fact that many problems that seem 
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to be theoretically manageable can develop into uncontrolled situations due to 
the behaviour of fi nancial markets (De Grauwe 2011). To the extent that part 
of the problem is the way fi nancial markets operate, insisting on the adoption 
of tough national adjustment policies at signifi cant economic and social cost is 
not only unfair but also unlikely to be economically effective. So, for example, 
without the completion of the banking union (in particular the common deposit 
guarantee system), the credibility of banks, particularly in countries whose 
banking sector still experiences diffi culties, will continue to be low. This in turn 
will have a negative impact on banks’ ability to fulfi l their intermediary role, 
thereby delaying the consolidation of a sustainable recovery. In other words, the 
lack of supranational risk-sharing mechanisms prolongs market uncertainty, 
making their adjustment more diffi cult and painful than necessary.
For this reason, a number of voices have been arguing that the two options 
should be treated not as alternatives but as complementary: supranational 
solidarity mechanisms facilitate adjustment at national level, which makes it 
less likely that they will actually be used. This interpretation is evident in the 
Commission’s 2017 proposals and has also been adopted by offi cials of all EU 
institutions, like the ECB (Draghi 2018), the European Fiscal Council (Beetsma 
and Larch 2019) and the European Commission (Buti 2020). In addition, in order 
to address the concern about the moral hazard of the creditor countries, many 
of the proposals include a series of measures to discourage their possible abuse.
Alas, progress is not probable in the foreseeable future as the two sides in 
the political economy contest seem immovable; the negative attitude maintained 
by both Germany and a number of other countries in Northern Europe has al-
ready been recorded on many of the Commission’s proposals. The resistance of 
these countries is not only a matter of defi nition of their national interests, on 
the basis of the question of moral hazard described earlier, but also stem from 
internal politics, as the crisis has shaped trends of Euroscepticism not only in 
the countries that have implemented hard adjustment programmes, but also in 
the creditor countries.
The Joint Communication between France and Germany in Mesenberg on 
19 June 2018, largely confi rmed the political diffi culties of the project. The most 
ambitious and rather unexpected proposal in the joint declaration was to cre-
ate a budget for the euro area. Despite the initial surprise, the proposal, was 
actually not what many people thought; the proposed budget was linked to EU’s 
multiannual fi nancial framework, which diminished expectations regarding its 
size, particularly in a post-Brexit context. Moreover, the proposed budget was 
meant to promote competitiveness and convergence and not function as a stabili-
zation mechanism. On the other hand, the declaration also contained a proposal 
perifereia t.9o.indd   101 15/6/2020   1:18:03 μμ
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/08/2021 04:02:15 |
[102] ΠΕΡΙΦΕΡΕΙΑ 
for part of the budget to fi nance a European Unemployment Fund, on the basis 
of budgetary neutrality between the countries. With regard to the Banking Un-
ion, it was proposed that the fi scal backstop should be in the competence of the 
ESM, but start operating only if signifi cant progress is made in reducing risks 
to member states’ banking systems, in particular those arising from the issue of 
non-performing loans. 
The Eurozone Summit of 14 December 2018 fully adopted the priorities 
and proposals of the French-German cooperation. In addition to decisions taken 
about the fi scal backstop of the Banking Union’s resolution fund, and other tech-
nical modifi cations of ESM’s institutional features, in the direction of the propos-
als of the French-German declaration, the Summit also approved the integration 
into the Multiannual Financial Framework of a fi scal tool specifi cally for the 
Eurozone. This tool will be used to promote the competitiveness and convergence 
of European economies, while no reference is made to the possibility of fi nancing 
a European Unemployment Fund. The June and December 2019 Euro Summits 
recognized the technical progress made in implementing the above decisions 
without deciding on any major new reforms.
7. Conclusions
N ational preferences and economic idiosyncrasies dictate different fi scal pol-icy priorities and attitudes towards defi cit spending in different countries. 
Such differences affect the frequency, intensity and duration of discretionary fi s-
cal policy, leading to different fi scal stances. This is problem in a monetary union 
is necessary because uncoordinated fi scal policies do not allow the adoption of a 
union-wide fi scal stance, and consequently the coordination between fi scal and 
monetary policy. In addition, discretionary fi scal policy faces serious technical 
diffi culties and holds an irresistible political appeal for incumbent governments 
leading to a defi cit bias in public fi nances. This is also a problem in a monetary 
union, because the fi scal derailment of a member state can have adverse spillo-
ver effects for the other members of the union. On the other hand, economic 
theory argues in favor of central, ‘federal’ mechanisms for the exercise of fi s-
cal functions, particularly for stabilization purposes. As a result, in a monetary 
union of sovereign states, there is a need to monitor and control national fi scal 
policy, but also to support it in times of need. 
The fi scal governance decided at Maastricht was imbalanced and inade-
quate in both respects. Being the result of a political compromise, it instituted 
a decentralized ‘individual responsibility’ approach, with no effective compli-
ance mechanism and no support facilities for times of economic turbulence. Its 
weaknesses, revealed by the global fi nancial crisis, contributed to Eurozone’s 
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deterioration into a second, debt crisis and a double dip recession. The lack of 
institutional provisions for dealing with the crisis, turned its handling into a de 
facto political and therefore intergovernmental process where creditor countries, 
enjoying a highly asymmetrical negotiating advantage, dictated both the terms 
of the bailout agreements and the provisions of the new fi scal governance. Be-
ing essentially a reinforced version of the pre-crisis framework, the ‘reformed’ 
fi scal governance has tried to balance confl icting objectives with little success; it 
is simultaneously more constraining and more prone to political maneuvering, 
increasingly complex while leaving more room for variable interpretations, and 
ultimately it is not more effective than its predecessor. 
As a result, a short few years after the new fi scal governance has been im-
plemented, the calls for a new reform are multiplying. Unfortunately, substan-
tial progress does not seem likely in the near future; the central issue, which is 
the management of the problems inherited by the crisis in a number of countries 
and banking institutions, continues to divide the member states. The question 
is whether countries should be left to manage them on their own, taking on the 
costs involved and then going ahead with the most ambitious reforms, or wheth-
er risk-sharing mechanisms should be created now, facilitating the adjustment 
and reducing its cost. This question has obvious distributional and therefore 
political implications. Given the rise of Eurosceptic parties in both crisis-hit and 
creditor countries, the political resolution of EMU’s fi scal predicament any time 
soon seems very diffi cult.
Notes
* The article is based on work done for a research project on EU’s fi scal policy, 
assigned by the Bank of Greece to ELIAMEP.
1. According to the theory, each fi scal function should be exercised at the lowest 
possible level of governance where it is most effective (Oates 1972). 
2. The coincidence of these criteria in the two theories should not come as a sur-
prise given that typically federal states are also monetary unions.
3. Empirically, this argument is supported by the extremely low level of interest 
rate spreads for the public debt of different member states of the Eurozone 
in the early years of its operation. This has been attributed to the markets’ 
conviction of the existence of an implicit bail-out clause, despite the Treaty 
no-bailout provision. 
4. Again, this was seen in the EMU already from the fi rst years of its operation 
with the refusal of Germany and France to abide by the rules, in conditions of 
economic recession (see next section).
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5. On the other hand, as already noted, the markets’ conviction about an implicit 
bailout clause in a monetary union of sovereign states, may relax their disci-
pline and allow governments to borrow more than it is economically justifi ed.
6. In 1969, the Heads of State of the European Economic Community (EEC) 
instructed a committee under Pierre Werner, Prime Minister of Luxembourg, 
to formulate a plan for the implementation, in stages, of the economic and 
monetary union of their countries.
7. There were other countries that did not meet the debt criterion but were close 
to it, which allowed the Commission to declare that provided fi scal consolida-
tion efforts continued, these countries’ debt would soon fall below the 60% 
threshold (European Commission 1998).
8. If fi scal governance proved ineffective, macroeconomic coordination was al-
most entirely absent; it was based on the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, 
which were rather generic and essentially non-binding. In this context, the 
development of signifi cant imbalances in productivity, wage policies and the 
current account were not surprising.
9. The adverse effects of large capital infl ows were not exhausted on the fi scal 
front but led to broader macroeconomic imbalances, which weakened further 
the position of the periphery economies once the crisis hit. 
10. There is a large literature on the design of the bailout programmes and their 
consequences, which is outside the scope of this paper.
11. The debate on a European safe asset continues. In recent years, experts (e.g. 
Brunnermeier et al. 2016) have suggested European Safe Bonds (ESBies), 
which are now referred to as Sovereign Bond-Backed Securities (SBBS), i.e. 
securities backed by a diversifi ed portfolio of euro area government bonds. 
The European Commission has endorsed this proposal and on May 2018 re-
leased a proposal for a Regulation on SBBS. 
12. The ESM was preceded by the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 
and the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM) established in 2010.
13. Despite the establishment of a new resolution process, the link between sov-
ereigns and banks is not as easy to break as thought, as demonstrated by the 
banking crisis in Italy in 2017. 
14. A similar picture emerges in the fi eld of macroeconomic coordination, where 
stipulations produced by both the European Semester and the macroeconomic 
imbalance process do not appear to be taken seriously by the Member States 
(Alcidi and Gros 2014, Begg 2017).
15. A particularly infl uential paper in this context was the so-called policy pa-
per ‘No 91’ of the prestigious Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), 
in which 14 prominent economists from Germany and France put forward a 
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series of proposals for reform (Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2018). These proposals 
received praise but also critique, from many quarters, primarily for their lack 
of ambition and their affi nity to the offi cial German position. See for example 
the Blueprint for a democratic renewal of the eurozone, Politico, 28.2.2018 (the 
counter-proposals of another 14 economists and politicians), Merler (2018) 
and Messori and Micossi (2018).
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Framework for the coordination of budgetary and economic policies to achieve 
the objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy. It takes place in the fi rst half of 
each year before the preparation of national budgets. It was fi rst implemented 
in November 2010.
‘Six-Pack’
A package of six legislative measures that revised the Stability and Growth 
Pact. It was adopted in December 2011 by all EU Member States and aims to 
strengthen member states’ fi scal compliance by reforming provisions for the 
imposition of fi nancial fi nes in the event of a fi scal derailment and of excessive 
macroeconomic imbalances. In the revised Stability and Growth Pact, the 
Commission’s proposals for sanctions against Member States which do not take 
satisfactory measures to correct their budgetary imbalances are taken on the 
basis of the negative majority rule, i.e. the Commission’s proposals are adopted 
automatically, unless a qualifi ed majority of Member States disagree.
Fiscal Compact 
International agreement of EU Member States. The aim of the pact is to 
strengthen budgetary discipline. The most important provision of the Pact is 
that Member States should incorporate into national law the rule of the balanced 
budget. This rule provides for a structural defi cit of up to 1% of GDP if public 
debt is less than 60% of GDP and 0.5% of GDP if debt is more than 60% of GDP, 
in which case it should be reduced (by a rate of 1/20th of the above-threshold 
debt). An automatic correction mechanism should be put in place if deviation 
from the objectives is observed. It entered into force on 1 January 2013.
‘Two-Pack’
Package of two European Regulations to strengthen the supervision and 
control of the budgetary policy of the Member States. Increased supervisory 
and accountability obligations are provided for by states facing or likely to face 
fi nancial stability problems. The screening of the draft national budgets by the 
Commission before their adoption by the national parliaments is also established. 
The Commission can examine the draft plans and submit recommendations 
in the event that they lead to budgetary and macroeconomic derogations; the 
Commission does not have veto power, in the event of non-compliance with its 
perifereia t.9o.indd   111 15/6/2020   1:18:04 μμ
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/08/2021 04:02:15 |
[112] ΠΕΡΙΦΕΡΕΙΑ 
instructions. It is also envisaged to set up independent fi nancial councils in each 
Member State with a view to monitor more effectively the implementation of 
fi scal planning and the compliance with the rules set out in both the Stability 
and Growth Pact and the Fiscal Compact. The Regulations are in place since 
May 2013.
European Fiscal Board 
In the wake of the proposals of the Five Presidents’ Report, the European 
Commission set up the European Fiscal Board. The Board’s objective is to 
ensure transparency and coordination of fi scal policy at the European level. In 
this context, the Board supervises the implementation of fi scal planning at both 
national and European levels, formulates proposals for the overall fi scal position 
of the EU, as well as for the Member States, and proposals for the reform of 
the EU’s fi scal governance, and cooperates with the independent national fi scal 
councils. The Council began its work in October 2016 and in November 2017 
published its fi rst report.
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